We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine investors' investment decisions and related assessments of managers' stewardship. We provide evidence that investors' stewardship assessments fall prey to correspondence bias; that is, investors attribute external (i.e., nonmanager-related) causes of company performance to managers' performance. We predict and find that fair value information enables investors to make better stewardship and investment decisions than investors with amortized cost information. We also find that investors presented with amortized-cost-based financial statements perform better to the extent they access fairvalue-based footnote information, while investors presented with fair-value-based financial statements perform worse to the extent they access amortized-cost-based footnote information. Collectively, our results suggest that investors' stewardship and investment decisions are improved because fair value information allows them to disentangle endogenous actions by managers from exogenous market forces that are outside of managers' control, and thus mitigate correspondence bias.
The Effect of Alternative Accounting Measurement Bases on Investors' Resource Allocation
Decisions and Assessments of Managers' Stewardship
Introduction
We investigate whether, when holding information constant, the use of fair value measurements in the primary financial statements improves financial statement users' (hereafter, "investors'") investment decisions and results in more accurate judgments about managers' stewardship. Opponents of incorporating fair value measurements into the primary financial statements argue that fair values do not meet information needs relative to the stewardship objective of financial reporting, and maintain that amortized-cost-based financial statements are necessary to assess stewardship (e.g., Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Nissim & Penman, 2008) . We propose that, compared to amortized-cost-based measurement, reported fair value measures in the primary financial statements provide information in a more transparent manner that will reduce the burden of processing, improve the accuracy of stewardship assessments, and increase the quality of investment decisions.
In addition to the controversy over financial reporting objectives, the question of which is the most appropriate measurement basis for recognized financial statement elements continues to be one of the most difficult issues addressed by standard setters. As either a cause or a consequence of this difficulty, the conceptual frameworks of the FASB and IASB presently are largely devoid of any conceptual guidance on accounting measurement issues. Specifically, the (1984, par. 66-70) and the IASB's Conceptual Framework (2014, par. 4.54-4.56) include only terse lists of measurement bases historically observed in financial statements, and provide no guidance about the conditions under which one measurement basis may be preferred over another. According to Whittington (2008, p. 154), continuing work on the measurement sections of the conceptual frameworks is likely to be lengthy and highly contentious because measurement issues often are reduced to an unproductive competition between fair value and amortized cost bases of measurement.
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To correctly assess stewardship, we propose that investors must (1) receive information that is sufficiently relevant and sufficiently precise for the task, and (2) disentangle management's contribution to firm performance from factors outside of management control (e.g., environmental factors). In this study, we leverage the comparative advantage of controlled experiments to hold constant the first requirement to allow us to evaluate the effect of measurement basis on the second. Specifically, we conduct a laboratory experiment to provide empirical evidence relevant to the intersection of financial reporting objectives (i.e., investment decisions and stewardship assessments) and measurement bases (i.e., amortized cost and fair values). Our tests are motivated 1 The debate about the use of fair values in financial statements has been ongoing for most of the 20th Century and has crept into the 21 st Century (e.g., Chambers, 1966; MacNeal, 1939; Paton & Littleton, 1940; Watts, 2003) . As described by Hodder, Hopkins & Schipper (2014) , many of the arguments on both sides of the debate remain seemingly intact and untouched by the passage of time.
by analytic and psychology research. Analytic research suggests that high-quality stewardship assessments depend on principals' ability to separate the effects of manager actions from the effects of non-manager (i.e., exogenous) conditions and events that affect the firm. However, research in psychology suggests that investors will have difficulty accurately assessing managers' contribution to firm performance because of correspondence bias. Specifically, even if sufficient information is present, individuals generally have a hard-wired tendency to attribute cause to individual actors rather than accurately identifying the impact of exogenous or circumstantial factors (Ross 1977) . 2 Theory suggests that correspondence bias persists because observers attribute outcomes to salient features of the setting and usually fail to make the necessary adjustments to correct the automatic perceptual process (Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; Taylor & Fiske, 1975) . By making information about exogenous situational factors more salient, correspondence bias can be mitigated because decreased effort is required to consider situational factors (Gilbert, 1989; Quattrone, 1982) . We propose that, compared to amortized cost, fair value measurements provide more transparent information that can more easily reveal the effects of managerial actions and exogenous non-manager conditions and events.
Although our primary focus is on measurements recognized in the primary financial statements, we also investigate the influence of notes to the financial statements that include information about the other measurement bases on investors' stewardship assessments and investment decisions.
3 Because fair value information should be perceived as more transparent, we
propose that investors using amortized-cost-based financial statements will make higher quality stewardship assessments and investment decisions if they take the time and effort to process the fair value information in the notes. However, because amortized cost information provides less salient signals about exogenous shocks, we expect lower-quality stewardship assessments and investment decisions for users who view fair-value-based financial statements and spend additional time and effort processing the amortized-cost-based information in the footnotes (Nisbett, Zukier & Lemley, 1981; Hackenbrack, 1992) .
In our experiment, participants assume the role of investors who assess the quality of the firm's management and/or allocate investment capital to the firm. A controlled experiment has advantages for testing our research questions because we are able to investigate the effects of a fair value recognition regime that is largely unobservable in naturally occurring settings, and because we are able to collect information on investors' decision processes and judgments that are unavailable in archival databases. Further, our setting allows us to carefully structure an economic environment where changes in firm value are determined solely by a combination of (1) exogenous, systematic market forces and (2) managerial actions conditional on those forces.
Ensuring that fundamental values and reported results are determined only by a combination of exogenous shocks and managerial actions provides greater confidence that the differences we obtain across measurement bases are strictly a function of investors' ability to isolate the contribution of managerial actions to firm value.
Participants in the experiment receive information in the form of financial statements.
Approximately half of the participants receive financial statements in which assets and income are based on fair value. The remainder receive financial statements in which assets and income are [FASB 1991] currently codified in FASB Accounting Standards Codification Topic 825) and increased levels of such disclosure have been included in recent standard-setting proposals (e.g., FASB 2010b, par. 85).
based on amortized cost. We also provide to all participants footnote information that includes asset measurements using the measurement basis that is not included on the face of the financial statements (i.e., the total information set is the same across all participants). Specifically, participants in the fair-value (amortized cost) conditions can refer to footnote disclosures to obtain amortized cost (fair value) asset information.
Our results support our prediction that, holding information constant, recognition of fair values in the primary financial statements enables investors to more accurately assess the quality of manager's actions. This is due, at least in part, to the ability of fair value to ameliorate correspondence bias that is apparent when investors view amortized cost financial statements.
Specifically, we find that when a negative (positive) exogenous shock affects firm value, investors viewing financial statements that report amortized cost measurement are more likely to believe that firm management decisions were of relatively lower (higher) quality, regardless of actual management decision quality. For investors viewing fair-value-based financial statements, we do not find evidence of correspondence bias.
We also find that investors relying on fair-value-based financial statements make better asset allocation decisions compared to investors relying on amortized-cost-based financial statements, suggesting that fair value information is helpful both for asset allocation and for stewardship assessment. By examining process data, we confirm that better stewardship assessments and resource allocation decisions are attributable to investors' greater (lesser) use of fair value (amortized cost) information, even when that information is in the footnotes.
Specifically, investors in the amortized cost condition spending more time with fair value footnotes performed better relative to investors spending less time on the fair value footnotes. In contrast, investors in the fair value condition spending more time on amortized cost footnotes performed worse than investors spending less time on amortized cost footnotes.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows: In section 2, we outline our theory and hypotheses; in section 3, we describe our operationalization of stewardship, experimental task, and research design; in section 4 we discuss our results; and in section 5 we conclude our study.
Theory and Hypotheses
Intersection of Accounting Measurement and Stewardship
As noted by many accounting commentators, a theoretically neutral starting place for evaluating the relative merits of alternative measurement bases in the primary financial statements should begin with identifying the primary objectives of financial reporting. Following the identification of objectives, the usefulness of alternative measurement bases can be assessed relative to these objectives. However, at least some of the literature conflates these two steps by holding self-evident the joint propositions that (1) stewardship is the most important objective of financial reporting, and (2) that good stewardship can be achieved only with amortized-cost-based financial statements (e.g., Chen, 1975; Birnberg, 1980) . Why stewardship and amortized cost are so closely linked is unclear; however, several authors assert that amortized cost, transaction-based accounting information is desirable primarily because it is more verifiable (e.g., Demski & Sappington, 1993; Watts, 2003) . Others note the linkages between stewardship and agency theory, and argue that information relevant for incentive and control purposes necessarily focuses on completed transactions and past performance, rather than estimates and future-oriented projections (Ball, 2001; Barclay, Gode, & Kothari, 2005) . These arguments shift the focus of the measurement basis debate by introducing a more specific set of potentially testable, but largely untested, assertions: (1) that amortized-cost-based accounting 8 information is inherently more verifiable than fair-value-based accounting information, and (2) that amortized-cost-based financial information is inherently more contractible than fair-valuebased financial information in an agency setting.
There are reasons to question-and for scholars ultimately to test-both of these assertions.
First, despite persistent claims (e.g., Ramanna & Watts 2012) , research provides no empirical evidence that fair values are inherently less verifiable than amortized costs (see discussion in Hodder et al. 2014) . Although fair valuation potentially introduces measurement uncertainty into financial statements, the practice of deferring and amortizing costs potentially introduces both measurement uncertainty and existence uncertainty. This is because amortized cost financial statements are based on a set of accruals, deferrals, and allocations, the objective appropriateness of which is difficult to independently verify. 4 As Glover, Ijiri, Levine, & Liang (2005) acknowledge, financial information can be classified along a continuum of verifiability across all measurement bases. Along this continuum, some fair-value-based measurements are likely to be more verifiable than some amortized-cost-based measurements. For example, the change in fair value of a marketable financial instrument may be much easier to verify than whether revenue has been earned in a particular period. Gjesdal (1981) recognizes that verifiability is not absolute, and establishes that information useful for stewardship must be only sufficiently verifiable at a reasonable cost. Because both fair values and amortized costs may meet these criteria, verifiability cannot be a sufficient justification for rejecting fair value as a measurement basis useful for stewardship.
Second, although evaluating managers based on realized observable outcomes facilitates "settling up" that may prevent ex post inequitable incentive payments (Leone, Wu, & Zimmerman, 2006) , such contracts may not incent optimal ex ante actions, and these ex ante actions more generally are the focus of contracting in an agency setting. For example, if incentive compensation is based on realizations, and outcome risk is sufficiently high, then risk-averse managers may be unwilling to accept projects that clearly are in the best interests of the shareholders (Weiss, 2011) .
In contrast to the view that performance information should facilitate observable outcome-based settling up, the agency literature establishes that performance information is most useful for control when it reduces uncertainty about agents' current actions, not necessarily current results (Gjesdal, 1981; Paul, 1992) . If changes in fair values reflect the present value of managerial actions, then fair values may be useful for contracting precisely because they are forward-looking aggregations of currently available information rather than realized outcomes. Because contracts based on "settling up" are not necessarily more efficient than contracts based on aggregations of currently available information, the fact that fair values reflect forward-looking information cannot be a sufficient justification for rejecting fair value measurement as a basis useful for stewardship.
The fact that verifiability and ex post settling-up value are not sufficient reasons for rejecting fair value as a stewardship-relevant measurement basis also does not imply that amortized cost-basis measurements should be rejected in favor of fair value measurements. We propose that identifying the conditions under which fair-value-based or amortized-cost-based measurements are more useful for stewardship is an empirical question. According to agency theory, the answer will be a function of which measurement basis best helps investors isolate the effects of managerial actions on firm value. As Paul (1992) summarizes, "to provide optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem, we need to weight information according to its informativeness about the manager's contribution, or value-added, to the firm" (p. 472).
Both amortized cost and fair value measurement bases produce summary outputs that reflect the effects of managerial actions; however, both measures also confound the effects of managerial actions with other exogenous events that impact the firm. For this reason, we posit that, holding information constant, the relative usefulness of alternative measurement bases in the primary financial statements must be a function of transparency. We define transparency loosely as financial statement presentation that facilitates the extraction of decision relevant information.
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Specifically, even if the contribution of the manager theoretically can be extracted from aggregated financial results by appropriate use of all recognized and disclosed information, investors may improperly attribute variation in firm performance to variation in manager actions if the effect of those actions is not sufficiently transparent. This is consistent with correspondence bias documented in psychology, which finds that individuals have a natural tendency to attribute cause to individuals, rather than considering exogenous or circumstantial factors (Ross, 1977) . We discuss correspondence bias in the next section.
Correspondence Bias
Incorrectly attributing changes in company performance to manager actions undermines the efficiency of incentive contracts that are based on financial results (Gjesdal, 1981; Paul, 1992) .
Several models exist to describe the attribution process, but all generally agree that the process of attributing cause to events can be broken into two steps: first, attributions are initially automatically activated based on observed stimuli, and second, more controlled processes may override initial automatic judgments when activated (Gilbert et al., 1988; Quattrone, 1982; Trope, 1986; Winter & Uleman, 1984) . These models also posit that initial attributional judgments on individuals can be incorrect, particularly when multiple causes for behavior are at play and ambiguity shrouds the cause-effect relationship.
Extant research on correspondence bias suggests that when observers initially attribute causes for outcomes, they tend to overweight personal dispositions in human actors (Ross, 1977) .
That is, in an environment where an outcome is dependent on two factors, one based on manager actions and the other resulting from an exogenous influence, individuals will overweight management's role and underweight the role of exogenous factors. Consistent with correspondence bias, we predict that when a report of firm performance is provided, investors will be prone to attribute cause to managers, irrespective of managers' contribution. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1a: Investors' assessment of management quality will be positively correlated with the effects of exogenous (i.e., non-manager) determinants of firm performance.
Effect of Measurement Bases on Correspondence Bias
To overcome the tendency of investors to incorrectly attribute exogenous components of firm performance to managers' actions, investors must correctly identify the direction and magnitude of managerial actions on firm performance, independent of the impact of exogenous factors. However, because the tendency to attribute cause for firm outcomes to managers is automatic, overcoming this potential bias may be difficult (Winter & Uleman, 1984) .
Correspondence bias is theorized to persist because (1) observers attribute outcomes to potential causes that capture attention, and (2) individuals fail to make a deliberate and conscious effort to adjust original automatic causal attributions (Gilbert et al., 1988; Taylor & Fiske, 1975) .
One way to correct for investors' tendency to attribute causes of firm outcomes to managers is by increasing the transparency of exogenous (i.e., non-manager-related) factors. In most settings, individuals' attributions focus on individuals rather than situational factors that are more difficult to visualize (Lassiter, Geers, Munhall, Ploutz-Snyder, & Breitenbecher, 2002) .
Therefore, when information regarding situational factors at play is provided more transparently, correspondence bias can be overcome by (1) shifting the perceptual focus of potential causes to exogenous forces (Gilbert, 2002) and (2) decreasing the effort required to consider situational factors (Gilbert, 1989; Quattrone, 1982) . Thus, we expect that accounting information that more transparently conveys the effects of both outside market forces and managerial action will allow investors to overcome the tendency to mistakenly blame or credit managers for firm outcomes resulting from exogenous forces.
Compared to amortized cost-based financial statements, we propose that reported fair value measurements in the primary financial statements provide information in a more transparent manner that will reduce the burden of processing and increase the accuracy of investors'
attributions. First, fair value changes are timelier than amortized cost changes because they reflect changes in condition prior to realization. Second, because fair values reflect exchange prices determined with reference to the aggregated assumptions of market participants (FASB Accounting Standards Codification 820-10-05-1B), they are inherently comparable across firms.
Therefore, observing correlated changes in fair value across firms is a direct signal of an exogenous shock to firm values. Although exogenous shocks may be systematic and highly correlated across similar firms, shocks arising from managerial actions will be correlated to a much lesser degree. This differential correlation enables investors to separate value changes driven by exogenous forces and managerial action.
Although amortized cost earnings will also reflect the realized effects of exogenous shocks to firm values, investors must process earnings innovations to estimate the magnitude and direction of value changes. Because investors' processing likely introduces estimation error and uncertainty to estimated value changes, across-firm correlations will be less transparent, and manager assessments will be less accurate for investors using amortized-cost-based financial statements.
This leads to our second hypothesis:
H1b: Fair value information on the face of the financial statements will mitigate investors' tendency to positively attribute exogenous components of firm performance to managers.
The Interactive Effect of Recognized and Disclosed Measurement Basis Information on Stewardship Assessment
We interpret better judgment performance in the fair value condition to greater transparency (i.e., lower processing costs) of recognized fair value information as compared to recognized amortized cost information. The Conceptual Framework states that in cases where qualitative characteristics are lacking, "additional disclosures may partially compensate" (FASB 2010a, QC34). We therefore also investigate the differential impact of recognized versus disclosed measurement basis information on stewardship assessment. If fair value information is provided in the footnotes to investors receiving amortized-cost-based financial statements, better performance on the part of investors receiving fair-value-based financial statements is consistent with the notion that recognition of fair values in the primary financial statements reduces cognitive costs relative to processing decision relevant information in the footnotes (Maines & McDaniel, 2000; Russo, 1977) . Given prior research on this matter, and supposing fair value recognition transparently provides information which would allow investors to disentangle market forces from managerial action, we hypothesize the following:
H2a: Investors given recognized fair value information on the face of the financial statements will be more accurate in their manager quality judgments than investors given recognized amortized cost information on the face of the financial statements.
Because fair value information is more transparent, we propose that the availability of fair value information in footnotes presents potential decision-useful benefits that should outweigh the cognitive effort necessary access financial statement footnotes (cf., Maines & McDaniel 2000; FASB 2010a, QC34) ; thus, we expect improved performance to the extent investors who view amortized-cost-based financial statements and who also invest the time and effort necessary to access fair value information in the footnotes. Stated more simply, we expect that investors who view amortized-cost-based information on the face of the financial statements to perform better at assessing stewardship to the extent they utilize the fair value information included in the footnotes.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2b: For investors receiving amortized-cost-based financial statements, the accuracy of their manager quality judgments will increase as they acquire and process fair value footnote information.
In contrast to the predicted benefits of using fair value footnote information, we also anticipate degradation in the accuracy of investors' judgments of managers' quality for investors who view recognized fair-value-based financial statements to the extent they access and use amortized cost information disclosed in the footnotes. This prediction is consistent with findings in psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al., 1981) and auditing (Hackenbrack, 1992 ) that suggest presenting less diagnostic information causes individuals to reduce the weight placed on diagnostic information. For this reason, we predict that the stewardship assessments of investors viewing fairvalue-based financial statements will be perform worse at assessing stewardship to the extent they utilize amortized cost information in the footnotes. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2c: For investors receiving fair-value-based financial statements, the accuracy of their manager quality judgments will decrease as they acquire and process amortized-costbased footnote information.
Taken together, H2b and H2c predict an interactive effect on stewardship assessment quality based on the extent to which investors access and use the footnote information. While prior accounting research has extensively investigated issues related to financial statement recognition versus footnote disclosure (e.g., Libby, Nelson & Hunton, 2006) , research to date has not investigated how footnote disclosure affects the use of recognized financial statement amounts.
The Effect of Fair Value on Investors' Investment Allocation Decisions
Compared to the assessment of stewardship, the use of financial statement information in investment allocation decisions is more straightforward. Investors consult financial statements to seek indicators of the intrinsic value of firms, regardless of the source or attribution of the intrinsic value (i.e., manager-caused or systematic). Because fair value is a market-based measure that impounds information about expected future cash flows, required rates of return and alternative possible uses of net assets, it provides a transparent indicator of net asset value when compared to the effortful investor-generated approximation of value based on discounted future earnings.
Consistent with the benefits of fair-value information that we discussed earlier, we propose that compared to amortized cost accounting, fair value recognition will provide investors with increased transparency of the firms' reported financial condition and performance. This improved transparency of fair value information will facilitate investors' identification of more favorable investment opportunities. This leads to the following hypothesis:
6 H3: Compared to recognized amortized cost information, recognized fair value information will result in investors making more optimal investment allocation decisions.
Operationalization of Stewardship, Experimental Setting, Design and Procedures
Operationalization of Stewardship
As noted by the IASB (2005) staff, the word "stewardship" has many different meanings in the financial accounting standard-setting literature. Consistent with the root word "steward," we propose that the focus of stewardship is the assessment of actions taken by stewards (i.e., managers) in the discharge of their responsibilities to preserve the value of investors' capital investment and to earn a commensurate return on that investment. In the modern corporation, these responsibilities relate to an agency relationship and the performance of some delegated activities on behalf of another party. These delegated activities include not only safeguarding of assets but also administering business resources in a way that generates an acceptable rate of return on those resources. When defined in this manner, stewardship can be considered a reasonable basis on which to engage, reward, punish, or discharge a business manager.
Because we wish to draw clear inferences about the effect of measurement basis on investors' ability to process relevant information, our operationalization of stewardship is designed to abstract away from many factors that confound investors' interpretation of financial performance in naturally occurring settings. Specifically, in our experiment, we create a setting in which investors know, ex ante, how exogenous shocks and managerial actions map into firm value.
Investors also know that an exogenous shock has occurred that was not foreseeable and that managers can only respond to the shock. We operationalize stewardship in terms of managers' reinvestment decisions because, as a fundamental managerial duty, these decisions are clearly relevant to the assessment of managerial performance as well as asset allocation (Ciesielski, 2013) .
In the experiment, these decisions have a direct and proportionate causal effect on future realized firm earnings, the value of firm assets, and firm value. High (low) quality managers reinvest more firm earnings in projects having higher (lower) net present values. Reinvesting in higher (lower) net present value projects increases (decreases) future realized earnings, the fair value of assets, and the value of the firm.
Setting
In our experiment, we employ an investment setting in which investors receive financial information containing a balance sheet, income statement and related footnote disclosures for two firms. Both firms are in the same industry, and as a result are exposed to the same industry-wide shocks. Both firms have two operating divisions that may be differentially affected by industrywide shocks. Investors are informed that the industry is exposed to exogenous economic shocks that may be either positive or negative with equal probability, and that such shocks increase or decrease, respectively, the demand for the products of one of the two divisions of each firm.
Investors are also informed that any shocks are expected to persist for a period of five years.
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Managers respond to shocks by reinvesting prior year's earnings into the two divisions.
Normatively, the relative quality of a manager depends on the extent to which the manager allocates capital to maximize firm value in response to the shock. That is, higher quality managers allocate more earnings to the division with higher future returns than lower quality managers. Each manager's decision to allocate earnings directly affects the firm's value. As such, there are two factors that affect a firm's value in our setting, the direction of the exogenous shock and the manager's capital allocation decision made in response to the shock. After reviewing the financial information, investors then make their judgments. To allow for learning and to simulate a condition in which investors analyze many firms in order to allocate capital, each participant repeats the experiment 20 times with 20 separate pairs of firms.
7 Because all participants are informed of the expected duration of exogenous shocks, amortized-cost-based earnings innovations can be transformed with effort to arrive at equivalent fair value changes (Nissim & Penman, 2008) . In more complex real world settings, unobservable persistence of realized earnings shocks is likely to add substantial uncertainty to investors' processing of amortized-cost-based earnings. Our theory suggests that this would further increase the functional transparency of fair value measurements relative to amortized cost measurements.
Design
To test our hypotheses we conduct a computer-based experiment using a 2 × 3 betweensubjects design. In each experimental session 20 independent pairs of firms in the same industry are presented in which managers' reaction to exogenous shocks differ in quality relative to the other firm. The relative difference in quality varies across pairs. Subjects assessing manager quality are asked to rate the quality of both managers. We manipulate (1) the measurement basis used on the face of the financial statements (full fair value versus amortized cost) and (2) the assigned judgment objective (investment allocation, stewardship-quality assessment, or both). 8 In the notes to the financial statements we also disclose the alternative measurement basis from that reported on the face of the financial statements. For example, in the fair value condition, assets at fair value are reported in the financial statements and assets at amortized cost are presented in the notes accompanying the financial statements. Participants include 109 Master of Business Administration and Master of Accounting students assuming the role of investors. All participants are randomly assigned to one of the six possible between-subjects conditions. Participants provide judgments for each pair of firms each round and are compensated based on the accuracy of their responses. On average, the experiment took 75 minutes to complete, and compensation was approximately $25.00.
Procedures
At the beginning of the study, all participants complete training on the mechanics of fair value and amortized cost measurement bases in the context of fixed assets. Participants are then provided instructions regarding the experiment, including how their decisions affect their compensation. Next, participants engage in a practice round, after which they make decisions in 20 independent rounds. After the 20 th round, participants complete a brief post-experimental questionnaire. Amounts in the experiment are expressed in laboratory currency. At the end of each experimental session, participants' cumulative earnings in laboratory currency are converted to U.S. dollars, and paid to participants in cash at the end of the session.
A summary of each round is presented in Figure 1 . Figure 2 presents the information for one round in an amortized cost (fair value) condition, where amortized cost (fair value) information is recognized in the financial statements and fair value (amortized cost) information is disclosed in the footnotes.
Participants were informed that the likelihood of a positive and negative shock is equal, that firm managers could not anticipate the shock, and that the magnitude of the shock is expected to persist for a period of five years, thereby affecting the rate of return for the division's assets during that period. 9 For example, the shock to the firms in Panels A and B of Figure 2 is positive.
The direction of the shock is evident in the sales growth from 20X2 to 20X3 for Division A in each firm. 10 In addition, a revaluation adjustment is made in made to both Division A's balance sheet and income statement to reflect the changes in fair value (Panel B). Due to market conditions created by the exogenous shock, the firms' earnings may be greater than or less than the cost of capital, and investments in productive assets' earnings above (below) the cost of capital generate unrealized gains (losses).
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The financial information for 20X3 is updated both for the exogenous shock and for managers' allocation of prior year earnings to the two divisions. For example, illustrating the greatest difference in manager quality across firms, Panels A and B of Figure 2 , show that the manager of Firm A allocates 100% of prior earnings to the division that did not experience a shock (Division B), while the manager for Firm B allocates 100% of earnings to the division that did experience the shock (Division A). Because the shock was positive and thus increased the demand for Division A's products, the optimal action is to allocate 100% of prior year's earnings to 9 See Appendix for a detailed discussion regarding the assumptions used in the valuation of the firm. 10 Although the direction of revenue innovations is unambiguous, the allocation of depreciation costs in amortized cost accounting may partially obscure the effects of revenue innovation trends on net income, particularly when nonlinear depreciation methods are used. To minimize the obfuscating effects of depreciation allocations and any propensity to naively focus only on net income, we 1) apply straight-line depreciation when amortized cost information is presented and 2) remove Net Income as a line item in the financial statements. We believe both of these decisions bias against our predictions. Consistent with full fair value recognition, no depreciation is recognized when fair value information is presented. 11 Financial statement information provides inputs for valuation that are helpful for assessing the amount, timing, and/or risk of future cash flows. To achieve the strongest experimental control, we hold risk and timing of cash flows constant and assess participants' ability to extract information provided by the financial statements that is relevant for revising expected cash flows assessments. We also hold constant CEO demographics. All CEOs are Caucasian males that appear to be between the ages of 30 to 60 years old and are randomly assigned within each pair of firms. Finally, to avoid order effects, we counterbalance the placement of firms on the left and right side of the screen, and the division to which the shock occurs.
Division A. As such, the manager for Firm A (Firm B) in Figure 2 is classified as higher (lower) relative quality. It is important to note that participants can correctly identify managers' relative quality using either amortized cost or fair value financial statements. In both conditions, the change in sales from 20X2 to 20X3 provides an indication of the direction and what division was affected by the shock, and the change in gross assets from 20X2 to 20X3 allows the identification of the manager's capital allocation decision. The primary difference between the two conditions is that the fair value financial statements provide revaluation adjustments to income and division assets, which provides more transparent measures of the impact of the shock as well as the manager's capital allocation decision. Figure 3 provides economic shock and manager-assetallocation information for each of the 20 firm pairs used in the experiment.
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In
Step 3, participants are informed that they lost or earned compensation based on their investment during the year the shock occurred. We choose to have each investor initially equally invested (50%) in each firm to increase their personal involvement in the task and to provide a salient incentive to attend to the experimental task. In
Step 4, participants in conditions that include asset allocation decisions then decide if and how they would like to adjust the amount of capital allocated between the two firms. Participants can allocate any percentage of their capital between the two firms, and participants' compensation is based on the percentage of capital they allocate to the firm that would generate greater returns in the next year.
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Step 5, the subset of participants assessing managers' stewardship make assessments of each manager's quality on a scale from "worst possible quality" to "highest possible quality." If participants rate one manager greater than another manager, they receive a message confirming that they rated one manager higher than another, followed by a question asking them how confident they were on a scale between 0 and 100 that they have chosen the firm with the higher quality manager. Participants earn (lose) compensation for correctly (incorrectly) identifying which manager was of higher quality. The extent of gain or loss is based on the confidence they give in their assessment. 14 Panel C of Figure 2 provides an example of both the investment and manager quality decisions participants make. Finally, in
Step 6 participants receive feedback in terms of the compensation they earned during the round based on their decisions. 
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Tests of H1a and H1b
H1a predicts that investors' assessments of management quality will be influenced by exogenous components of firm performance. To test H1a, and thereby establish that 14 The incentives corresponding to participants' stewardship judgments are provided as a proxy for an action which investors may take (e.g., a "say on pay" initiative) which allows voting shareholders to preserve manager contracts and corresponding investor returns, or change the principal-agent incentive contract and allow potential for manager turnover and changes in investment returns. 15 Process data reveal that some participants spent less than 15 seconds on each screen, making it impossible for participants to consider the information contained on each page. Approximately 90% of these observations were in the last 10 rounds. Because frustration with the task may be negatively correlated with transparency, we exclude from all analyses a total of 123 (5.6%) out of 2,177 observations for which time spent was less than 15 seconds. Statistical inferences are unchanged when these observations are included. 16 All regressions are adjusted for repeated measures (clustered at the participant level). In addition, we conduct all tests using all 20 rounds of data, and separately using only the last 10 rounds of data to assess the effects of learning on the advantage of transparency. Statistical inferences do not differ when only the last 10 rounds are evaluated.
correspondence bias exists in our setting, we conduct a regression with MgrQuality as the dependent variable and PosShock as the independent variable. MgrQuality is the manager rating each participant gave to a firm manager (-100 to 100), with higher values representing higher perceived manager quality. Within each pair of managers, although one manager is of higher quality than the other, the extent of difference in quality varies across firm pairs, and there is no normatively correct magnitude for participants' perception of quality. Because our aim is to test only whether the perception of quality differs as a function of the exogenous shock, we include
PosShock; an indicator variable that is equal to one (zero) if there was a positive (negative) shock.
A significant coefficient on PosShock indicates that perceptions of quality are higher when shocks are positive than when shocks are negative.
We designed the experiment so that participants would see a variety of shock-managerrelationships, thereby making it impossible to heuristically infer systematic patterns in the shockmanager relationship in the study (e.g., participants could not immediately assume manager quality was the opposite of the direction of the shock). However, in our tests of H1a and H1b, we restrict observations to firms that have crossed manager types from shock types (i.e., negative shock and high quality manager or positive shock and low quality manager). The directional difference between shock and manager type allows us to cleanly identify whether participants' quality judgments are influenced by the exogenous shock when they should not be. 17 If correspondence bias exists, we expect the coefficient on PosShock to be positive and significant. 17 Because there is no normatively correct magnitude of participants' quality ratings, a finding that participant quality ratings are more positive (negative) for high quality (low quality) managers when exogenous shocks are positive (negative) could be consistent either with greater accuracy in assessing manager type, or with correspondence bias. However, in the case where there is a positive shock and a low quality manager or a negative shock and a high quality manager (i.e., Cross = 1), participant quality ratings should not be associated with the direction of the exogenous shock. As such, in our tests of H1a and H1b we focus on instances where Cross = 1 and interpret an association between subject quality rating and exogenous shock direction as correspondence bias.
Panel A of 
Test of H2
The results of our first hypotheses document the existence of correspondence bias in our setting and that fair vale information mitigates the bias better than amortized cost. Our second set of hypotheses examines whether the reduction of correspondence bias through fair-value-based recognition leads to more accurate overall manager quality assessments, and whether the use of fair value (amortized cost) information in the notes leads to more (less) accurate manager quality assessments.
To test H2a, we conduct a logistic regression with MgrCorrect as the dependent variable and FV as the independent variable. The higher quality manager in each firm pair is defined as the manager who allocated a larger proportion of prior-period earnings to the division with a higher net present value. In each firm pair, participants rate both managers' relative quality. Using participants' ratings, our dependent variable MgrCorrect is equal to one (zero) if an investor correctly (incorrectly) identifies which firm had the higher quality manager. We expect the coefficient on FV to be positive and significant.
Results are presented in Table 3 , Panel A. Consistent with H2a, the coefficient on FV is positive (0.22) and marginally significant (p=0.065). 20 This suggests that fair value recognition more transparently provides information that allows investors to correctly assess manager quality relative to amortized cost recognition.
H2b (H2c) predicts that when participants assess stewardship using financial statements with recognized amortized cost (fair value) information, the extent to which the participants utilize supplemental fair value (amortized cost) footnote information will improve (diminish) their ability
This specification effectively tests a three-way interaction and allows us to empirically test whether the difference in manager quality ratings between fair value and amortized cost is driven by cases in which manager and shock types do not match. Untabulated results support H1b (Χ 2 = 41.46, p < 0.01). 20 When restricting our observations to firm pairs in which Cross=1, the positive coefficient on FV is significant at conventional levels (p = 0.03).
to correctly identify higher quality managers. For H2b and H2c, we conduct a logistic regression with MgrCorrect as the dependent variable and FV, NotesPercent, and NotesPercent*FV as independent variables. NotesPercent is the percentage of total time that participants spend reviewing the alternative cost basis notes to the financial statements each round. We expect the interaction coefficient on NotesPercent*FV to be negative and significant. Table 3 presents the results of our test of H2b and H2c. Consistent with our hypotheses, the coefficient on NotesPercent*FV is negative (-6.80 ) and significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that as the percentage of time viewing fair value (amortized cost) information increases, stewardship assessment accuracy increases (decreases). The significantly positive coefficient on FV (1.11, p < 0.001) is consistent with greater accuracy for participants in the fair value condition after controlling for notes usage.
To more completely test recognized fair values versus recognized amortized cost with note disclosure of fair values, we compare the probability that the participants identify the higher quality manager in (1) the case of fair value recognition with no usage of amortized cost notes (i.e., NotesPercent=0) versus (2) the case of amortized cost recognition with the average amount of fair value notes usage observed across participants in the amortized-cost condition (i.e., NotesPercent=18 as reported in Table 1 ). Given these assumed levels of footnote usage, we find that participants in the fair value group correctly identified the higher quality manager (68%) more often (untabulated, p = 0.025) than participants in the amortized cost group (57%). These results provide additional support for the assertion that amortized cost recognition with fair value disclosure is not a substitute for fair value recognition.
Taken together, our tests of H2a-H2c suggest that the recognition of fair value information leads participants to make better stewardship assessments, and that this result obtains because fair value information is more transparently diagnostic than amortized cost information. The actual use of fair value (amortized cost) information, whether presented on the face of the financial statements or disclosed in the notes, leads to better (worse) stewardship assessments. Moreover, disclosure of relevant fair value information is not a substitute for recognition.
Tests of H3
H3 predicts that participants with fair value financial statements will make more optimal asset allocation decisions. In our setting, participants' asset allocation decisions are more optimal if they allocate more of their capital to the firm with the greater expected return. As such, we test H3 using a logistic regression with InvCorrect as the dependent variable and FV, NotesPercent, and NotesPercent*FV as independent variables. InvCorrect is equal to one (zero) if the investor allocated a majority (greater than 50%) of their capital to the firm with the higher (lower) future return. Independent variables are as previously defined. As reported in Table 4 , we find that participants make better capital allocation decisions when presented with fair value financial statements than when presented with amortized cost financial statements (p < 0.001). We also find a similar result regarding the effect of footnote information that we observed in our test of H2b and H2c. Specifically, we find that the interaction of FV and NotesPercent is negative (-5.17 ) and significant (p < 0 .001), which suggests that participants make worse financial decisions when they access the amortized cost information in the notes. Thus fair value information improves participants' asset allocation decisions as well as their stewardship judgments. The combined results of H2 and H3 provide evidence on the assertion made by the IASB that "in most cases, information designed for resource allocation decisions would also be useful in assessing management's performance" (IASB 2014, par. BC1.26).
Summary and Conclusion
We report the results of an experiment designed to evaluate the effects of alternative measurement bases on investors' assessments of firm value and managers' stewardship. We find that recognition of fair values in the financial statements enables investors to more accurately assess the quality of managers, consistent with the notion that fair value information more transparently conveys information about the opportunity costs and benefits of managements' reinvestment choices when there are multiple projects with differing net present values. We also find that use of fair value information improves the asset allocation decisions of investors in the firm, relative to use of amortized cost information.
Our results indicate that the relatively poor performance of investors presented with amortized-cost-based financial statements is due, in part, to the ability of fair values to ameliorate correspondence bias that occurs with the use of amortized-cost-based financial statements.
Specifically, we find that investors viewing financial statements with recognized amortized cost measurements are more likely to attribute exogenous components of firm performance to managerial actions. This tendency is relevant to the agency literature that suggests that the efficiency of contracting can be improved when performance reports allow those who monitor managers to infer the contribution of manager decisions to firm value (e.g., Paul, 1992) .
Our examination of process data indicates that better stewardship judgments and resource allocation decisions are due to investors' actual use of fair value information. That is, we find that investors presented with amortized-cost-based financial statements perform better to the extent they access fair-value-based footnote information. In contrast, investors presented with fair-valuebased financial statements perform worse to the extent they access amortized-cost-based footnote information.
Our results have several important implications. First, despite the improved performance that results from disclosing fair values when financial statements are based on amortized cost information, disclosure of fair values is not a substitute for recognition; that is, investors accessing fair value footnote disclosures perform worse, on average, than those investors with access to fairvalue-based financial statements. These results are consistent with the findings of prior research suggesting that, compared to financial statement recognition, footnote disclosures increase the cognitive costs of processing decision-relevant financial-accounting information (e.g., Maines & McDaniel, 2000) . Second, our results suggest that including amortized-cost-based footnote information with fair-value-based financial statements may degrade the quality of investors' judgments about stewardship and asset allocation. This is consistent with prior research on the ability of individuals to properly assess opportunity costs, which is essentially what fair value information measures.
Fair-value-based financial statements improving investors' ability to identify good managerial actions and investment opportunities is consistent the results of Neumann and Friedman (1978) who find that decision makers in business contexts are more likely to consider the effects of opportunity costs when those costs are explicitly provided. Our finding that use of amortized-costbased footnotes results in degraded performance for investors provided with fair-value-based financial statements is consistent with Vera-Munoz (1998), who finds that knowledge structures based on amortized-cost accounting paradigm interfere with decision makers' ability to appropriately incorporate opportunity costs into business decisions. This difficulty is encountered because opportunity cost is a forward-looking concept, while the focus of amortized-cost-based financial statements is on matching costs (i.e., frequently sunk costs) to revenues earned in a period (Dichev, 2007, p. 21) .
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Our study is subject to important caveats. First, our setting is highly stylized and designed to provide confidence that the effects we observe are caused by alternative modes of information 21 Indeed, Dichev (2007) echoes the themes included throughout Paton and Littleton (1940) , when he notes that "[o]perating assets are not really independent assets but essentially just a listing of unexpired costs." presentation, rather than different information. We acknowledge that our simplified task does not necessarily allow us to draw inferences about the extent to which investors would be able to successfully identify managers' contribution to value in more complex real world settings. For example, investors typically have access to information beyond traditional financial reports to help them make decisions. Research that extends our work to settings that include ancillary sets of information that allows investors to disentangle firm and management performance could prove quite fruitful. Additionally, our primary concern in this study is how investors' judgment and decision performance differs across a traditional amortized cost recognition regime and a fair value recognition regime in the context of well-defined judgment tasks. Our study cannot speak to other judgments that may be served by amortized cost or fair value-based information, which we leave to future research.
Our setting also holds constant (by exclusion) the potential for intentional or unintentional measurement error in reported amortized cost earnings and fair value balance sheet measurements.
Whether fair value measurements are characterized by "more" measurement error than amortized cost measures is a context-dependent empirical question. However, lower measurement error, by itself, is not sufficient for superior decision usefulness. Consideration must be given to transparency, comparability, and timeliness. As Gjesdal (1981) observes, to be useful decisionrelevant information must simply be sufficiently verifiable at a reasonable cost. Future research can extend our findings and investigate the effects of measurement error on the stewardship-and valuation-related use of fair value and amortized cost based measurement.
Our findings support the notion that fair value information can be beneficial for both investment allocation and stewardship assessments. This suggests that the benefits of amortized cost information for assessing stewardship are not absolute, and that the debate over the relative usefulness of fair value and amortized cost information can benefit from considering not whether, but under what conditions, amortized-cost-based financial statements or fair-value-based financial statements are likely to provide more useful information.
APPENDIX
Fundamental Value of Each Firm
In our experiment, the fundamental value of each firm is based on discounted cash flows. We assume that the cost of capital remains constant over the entire horizon and that the firm is capable of generating abnormal earnings over certain horizons in one of its divisions. 22 For a division not generating abnormal earnings, additional investment will have a zero net present value, meaning that a dollar of investment has a fair value equal to one dollar. For a division generating abnormal earnings, additional investment may reflect either a positive or negative net present value if the earnings rate is above or below the cost of capital. When abnormal returns are generated by a division, we assume they persist for a period of five years after which time abnormal earnings revert to the cost of capital. These declining abnormal returns are consistent with the firm earning rents for production capacity in place when there are time-dependent barriers to entry. We assume that production can be increased over certain ranges of demand without changing unit costs (i.e., both fixed and variable) or unit prices. For this reason, a positive demand shock results in positive abnormal earnings that are proportional to investment in that division. Conversely, a negative demand shock results in negative abnormal earnings that are proportional to investment in that division.
At t=0, the value of each division of a firm Di,0 is given by the following formula:
The variable I is the investment in productive capacity at the beginning of the period, Pp (1-Pp) is the probability of a positive (negative) demand shock, Pe (1-Pe) is the probability of the firm having a more (less) effective manager, and gpe , gp ,ge, and g represent the growth rate of earnings under a positive shock with an value-maximizing manager, a positive demand shock with and a value-minimizing manager, a negative demand shock with a value-maximizing manager, and a negative demand shock with a value-minimizing manager. The weighted average cost of capital constant is represented by r, which is 0.12.
At t=1, subsequent to the positive or negative demand shock and corresponding manager reaction, the value of a division is updated to reflect the effect of the shock, the manager's capital allocation decisions, as well as the passage of time. The amount of capital allocated to each division is Ci. Less effective managers allocate new capital to the division with the lower expected earnings. At the end of t=1, the value of each division is given by (2a) through (2d), contingent on the shock and management type. 
At any valuation point, the fundamental value of the firm is equal to the sum of the expected values of its divisions. To provide a complete choice set, each firm always has one division for which the rate of earnings (g) is equal to the cost of capital, r. In designing the 40 firms used in this study, we cross the economic shock (i.e., positive vs. negative) with a range of relative manager types (i.e., good vs. bad). Each manager-shock relationship has equal representation across shock and manager types. Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Notes: Figure 1 presents a flowchart of the experiment. Participants received a similar flowchart during the experiment. The flowchart provided to the participants only presented the steps that were relevant to their condition. The following box shading/border indicates steps that were assigned only to participants in the asset allocation, stewardship or both (i.e., joint asset allocation and stewardship) conditions.
Decision made only by participants making asset allocation decisions
Decision made only by participants making stewardship assessments For each firm pair, the "Firm 1" and "Firm 2" were randomly assigned to be on the left side of the screen or left side of the screen, and were labeled "Firm A" (left side of screen) or "Firm B" (right side of screen). (See Panel C of Exhibit 2 for an example.) Additionally, the shock randomly occurred to either Division A or Division B in each firm, and the CEO picture and name were randomly assigned to either Firm A or Firm B for each firm pair. There were 42 total names and pictures, so each picture and name was used exactly once through the one practice round and 20 actual rounds. 
Figure 2 Example of Experimental Stimuli
MgrQuality
The manager ratings participants provided for each firm. Ranges in value from -100 to 100, with higher values representing higher manager quality.
MgrCorrect
Indicator variable that reflects whether participants correctly (one) or incorrectly (zero) identified which manager was higher quality.
Roundtime NotesPercent
The amount of time in seconds spent by participants in each round.
The proportion of time spent by participants accessing the notes to the financial statements relative to the total time spent in each round.
InvCorrect
Indicator variable that reflects whether participants allocated the majority of their funds into the firm with higher (one) or lower (zero) returns.
FV
Indicator variable that is equal to one (zero) if investor is presented with Fair Value (Amortized Cost) financial statements.
Cross
Indicator variable that equals one if manager is high (low) quality and exogenous shock is negative (positive), or zero if manager is high (low) quality and exogenous shock is positive (negative). Table 2 presents the results of a regression model employed to examine whether the direction of the shock affects participants' ability to assess manager quality after controlling for manager quality by restricting observations to firms where manager quality and shock direction differ (i.e., Cross=1). Panel B presents the results of a regression model employed to examine whether the measurement basis (either fair value or amortized cost) affects participants' tendency to rely on the shock to assess manager quality after restricting observations to firms where manager and shock type differ. Each observation represents an individual firm manager. MgrQuality, FV, and PosShock are as defined in Table 1 . P-values are estimated using Huber-White corrected standard errors clustered by participant. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Table 3 presents the results of a logistic model employed to examine whether participants make better managerquality assessment when using fair value information than when using amortized cost information, and to identify the relative contribution of those two measurement bases when they are either recognized or disclosed. Each firm pair represents an observation, and MgrCorrect=1 if the participant correctly identified the higher quality manager of a firm pair. NotesPercent is a continuous variable that is calculated by taking the time spent each round by participants viewing the notes divided by the total time spent by the participant during the round. The variables PosShock and FV are as defined in Table 1 . P-values are estimated using Huber-White corrected standard errors clustered by participant. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Table 4 presents the results of a logistic model employed to examine whether participants make more profitable capital allocation decisions when using fair value information than when using amortized cost information, and identifying the relative contribution of those two measurement bases when they are either recognized or disclosed. Each firm pair represents an observation. The logistic model has InvCorrect as a dependent variable. InvCorrect is equal to one if the investor allocated a majority of their capital (greater than 50%) to the firm with the greater expected return and zero if the investor did not. NotesPercent is a continuous variable that is calculated by taking the time spent each round by participants viewing the notes divided by the total time spent by the participant during the round. FV is as defined in Table 1 . P-values are estimated using Huber-White corrected standard errors clustered by participant. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
